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CHAPTERll 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER 0 
§11.1. Zoning: Public Purpose Educational Fa~lity Exemption. 
Harbor Schools, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Haverhill 1 islthe first reported 
Massachusetts case to decide what constitutes a pubh~purpose educa-
tional facility for purposes of the Zoning Act's exemptio for such facili-
ties from local zoning ordinances and by-laws. The 
1 
se was decided 
under section 2 of the former Zoning Act,2 hut its afplication would 
seem to extend 'to the new Act.3 : 
Harbor Schools, a non-profit ,corporation with three f4ciHties in Maine 
and Massachusetts, provided live-in care and educatio~ for emotionally 
disturbed children.4 It applied for and received a buil1ing permit from 
the Town of Haverhill in order to make repairs on an ~xisting building 
in contemplation of its use as a residential schooP !The Town later 
revoked the permit because of its impression that the ~roposed facility 
did not fall within the class of facilities exempted frpm local zoning 
regulation by former section 2.6 Harbor Schools apMaled the Town's 
decision of revocation to the superior court.7 ! 
0 RICHARD G. HUBER is Dean and Professor of Law, oston College Law 
School. The author gratefully and respectfully acknowledges I. the research and 
writing assistance provided by Ms. Paula Mahoney in the prepar,ion of this chapter. 
§11.1. 1 5 Mass. App. 600, 366 N.E.2d 764 ( 1977). 
2 Former G.L. c. 40A, § 2 provided in relevant part: "[N]o prdinance or by-law 
which prohibits or limits the use of land for any church or oth~r religious purpose 
or for any edu~.ational purpose which is religious, sectarian, denOJ!ninational or public 
shall be valid. I 
3 G.L. c. 40A, § 3, added by Acts of 1975, c. 808, § 3, is t~e successor statute 
to former G.L. c. 40A, § 2. It provides in relevant part: i 
No zoning ordinance or by-law shall ... prohibit, regulate or restrict the 
use of land or structures for religious purposes or for educaftion purposes on 
land owned or leased by the commonwealth or any of ~-s agencies, sub-
divisions or bodies politic or by a religious sect or denominat· n, or by a non-
profit educational corporation; provided, however, that such I nd or structures 
may be subject to reasonable regulations concerning the bu and height of 
structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, o n space, parking 
and building coverage requirements. 
4 5 Mass. App. at 602, 366 N.E.2d at 766. 
5 Id. at 601, 366 N.E.2d at 765. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
1
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§11.1 ZONING AND LAND USE 241 
The superior comt referred the case to a master. On the basis of the 
master's report, the court found that Harbor Schools operates "facili-
ties of an educational nature which serve a public purpose." 8 Accord-
ingly, the superior court declared that Harbor Schools was exempt 
under former chapter 40A, section 2, from the use restrictions of the 
Haverhill zoning ordinance.O The Board of Appeals of Haverhill and 
a Haverhill resident appealed.10 
The standard of review used by the Appeals Court was whether the 
master's findings were adequate to support the superior court's judg-
ment.H In assessing the adequacy of these findings, the App~als Court 
set forth the substance of the master's report. 
The master had reviewed the operation of a functioning Harbor 
Schools facility in Amesbury, Massachusetts, which was similar to the 
two other Harbor Schools located in Maine.12 He found that the 
school's purpose was the "education and improvement of emotionally 
disturbed children," 13 most of whom were referred by the Department 
of Public W elfare.H All the enrolled students needed special attention 
and individual care because of their emotional and psychological prob-
lems. Some of the students were so severely maladjusted that it was 
impossible for them to remain in a public sohool environment.15 The 
master found . that Harbor Schools met these individualized needs 
through provision of specially trained teachers, an amply qualified direc-
tor, diagnostic testing to identify individual needs, and standardized 
testing to measure achievement. 1 6 The master noted that the Harbor 
Schools' educational purpose was clearly set forth in its articles of in-
corporation and was recognized by federal tax exemptions granted the 
school as a non-profit educational institution.1; Another findirig was 
that the Department of Public Health had granted the Haverhill site 
Harbor Schools three month interim approval as an institution to which 
children with special educational needs might be referred.18 
8 Id., 366 N.E.2d at 765-66. 
o Id., 366 N.E.2d at 766. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 602, 366 N.E.2d at 766. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 603, 366 N.E.2d at 767. 
16 Id. at 603-04, 366 N.E.2d at 766-67. 
1i Id. at 604, 366 N.E.2d at 767. 
18 Id. at 601, 366 N.E.2d at 768. By statute, "[t]he curriculum at such an in-
stitution must for approval be equivalent, insofar as the department [of education] 
deems feasible, to the curriculum of children of comparable age and ability in the 
public schools of the commonwealth." See G.L. c. 71B, § 10, inserted by Acts of 
1972, c. 766, § 11. 
2
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The Board of Appeals' contention before the mast'r was that "the 
use to which the building is to be put [by Harbor Schpols] is merely a 
care facility for children, with underlying medical facilittes and with min-
imal educatiottal aspects .... " 1n In light of the master's report, the Board 
shifted its attack on appeal to the contention that "at the very most" 
the educational purpose of the proposed Harbor Schools facility was an 
equal objective with a rehabilitative purpose.20 The ~ppeals Court re-
jected this argument, reasoning that the words "educ~tion" and "reha-
bilitation" were not so distinct in function that the· mas~er was "required 
to quantify them relative to each other. They are not mutually exclu-
sive." 21 The court then set out to define the word 
1 
"educational" as 
that term appeared in former section 2 of chapter 40~.22 
I 
Since this was a case of first impression, the courtl looked to cases 
outside the zoning arena for guidance. It drew on Massachusetts prece-
dents broadly defining the word "education" for the purpose of prop-
erty tax exemptions.!!3 It determined that the defini~ion provided by 
Mount Hermon Boys' School v. Gill 24 in 1887 comports with the more 
modern one found in Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 
Webster's defines education as "the act or process of providing with 
knowledge, skill, competence, or usu[ally] desirable qualities or behavior 
or character or of being so provided esp [ ecially] by a 
1 
formal course of 
study, instruction, or training." 25 · 
Citing other Massachusetts tax exemption cases,26 tije Appeals Court 
found that live-in accommodations are not inconsistent with educational 
purposes.27 Relying on yet another Massachusetts tax exemption case 
and on persuasive precedent from Connecticut and tfew York zoning 
cases, the Appeals Court concluded that an institution I does not lose its 
educational character because its enrollment is confim!d to emotionally 
disturbed children.28 The Appeals Court found further support for its 
1n 5 Mass. App. at 606, 366 N.E.2d at 768. The language is taken from the 
master's report. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See note 2 supra. 
23 See Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers Province of St. Joseph, 334 Mass. 
530, 541, 137 N .E.2d 225, 231-32 ( 1956); Emerson v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 
185 Mass. 414, 418, 70 N.E. 442, 443 (1904); Mount Hermon Boys' School v. 
Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 146, 13 N.E. 354, 357 (1887). 1 
24 145 Mass. 139, 146, 13 N.E. 354, 357 ( 1887). ! 
25 See 1. WEBS TEn's THIRD NEW INTEHNATIONAL DICTIONARY I at 723 ( 1976). 
26 See South Lancaster Academy v. Lancaster, 242 Mass. S53, 556, 136 N.E. 
626, 629 ( 1922); Trustees of Phillips Academy v. Andover, 175 Mass. ll8, 125, 
55 N.E. 841, 843 (1900); President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Cambridge, 
175 Mass. 145, 146-47, 55 N.E. 844, 845 (1900). 
27 5 Mass. App. at 605, 366 N .E.2d at 768. I 
28 Id. at 605-06, 366 N.E.2d at 768, citing Assessors of Jiancaster v. Perkins 
School, 323 Mass. 418, 421-22, 82 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1948) I (retarded or badly 
3
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broad definition of the term "educational" in the public policy of the 
commonwealth as expressed by the legislature in providing for an edu-
cation for every child, and that a child's special needs must be considered 
in order for him to realize his educational potentiaJ.29 While chapter 
71B emphasizes education of special needs children in the regular pub-
lic schools, the court noted that the statute contemplates that such edu-
. cation may take place at a residential school.3° The Department of 
Education's interim approval of Harbor Schools under section 10 of 
chapter 71B was found to support the master's finding that Harbor 
Schools conducts systematic instruction on an individualized basis while 
it assists in the correction of emotional disturbances.31 
To qualify for zoning exemption under former chapter 40A, section 
2, a facility must be more than "educational." 32 It must also be either 
"public" or "religious" in nature. In addressing the question of the 
public nature of Harbor Schools, the Appeals Court cited the general 
standard, enunciated in an earlier case defining "public" for the purpose 
of former chapter 40A, section 2: the purpose of the facility "is to be 
determined by application of the well established principles which have 
been applied under other statutes or legal rules to determine whether 
the purpose of educational or other institutions is public or private as 
shown in the operations of the institutions and the benefit conferred 
thereby." 33 The master's findings that Harbor Schools' activities were 
not commercial in character, that they were not motivated by personal 
profit and that they generally setved a public purpose were decisive in 
the Appeals Court's determination that Harbor Schools was a public 
institution.34 The Appeals Court thus affirmed the judgment of the 
superior court that Harbor Schools was a public educational institution 
for the purpose of former chapter 40A, section 2. 35 
adjusted children requiring special education or medical treatment); Armstrong v. 
Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 158, 161 n.1, 168, 257 A.2d 799, 801 n.1, 804 
( 1969) (children with mild emotional disturbances, utilizing tutoring, remedial 
education, and rehabilitative techniques); Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Hill, 
11 N.Y.2d 182, 190, 193, 227 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658-59, 661, 182 N.E.2d 268, 271, 
273 ( 1962) (emotionally disturbed delinquent, dependent, or neglected boys re-
quiring special attention). 
29 5 Mass. App. at 606, 366 N.E.2d at 768, citing G.L. c. 71B, § 1, inserted by 
Acts of 1972, c. 766, § 11. 
30 5 Mass. App. at 607, 366 N.E.2d at 768, citing G.L. c. 71B, § 2, inserted by 
Acts of 1972, c. 766, § 11. 
31 5 Mass. App. at 607, 366 N.E.2d at 768. See note 18 supra. 
32 See note 2 supra. This dual requirement does not exist in the new enactment. 
See note 3 supra. 
33 5 Mass. App. at 607, 366 N.E.2d at 769, citing Worcester v. New England 
Institute and New England School of Accounting, Inc., 335 Mass. 486, 493, 140 
N.E.2d 470, 474 (1957). 
34 5 Mass. App. at 607-08, 366 N.E.2d at 769. 
35 Id. 
4
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Harbor Schools' broad definition of the term "edl' cational" does not 
provide limitless statutory exemption from municipa zoning ordinances 
for any residential facility serving disturbed youn sters. The public 
policy to educate all children and the particular fa 
1 
s of this case, i.e., 
qualified teachers, systematic instruction and testin$, and Department 
of Education interim approval, were important copsiderations in the 
Appeals Court's determination that Harbor Schools ~roposed an educa-
tional and public facility entitled to exemption fro~ local zoning ordi-
nances. Moreover, one of the definitions of "educati~m" adopted by the 
court stressed a formal course of study.36 A departpre from the tradi-
tional classroom regimen for the education of childreq with special needs 
would fit this definition, but it would seem that some! demonstrable level 
of education and educational standards must exist fck a finding of edu-
cational purpose. The conjunction of all the indic~tors of educational 
purpose found in Harbor Schools should not be necelssary for a residen-
tial facility to qualify for the exemption formerly ~ound in section 2, 
but now found in section 3 of chapter 40A, but th~ mere provision of 
residential facilities and care direct~d at the chil~ren's disturhances 
would not be sufficient alone to qualify an institutiqn for the statutory 
exemption. 1 
I 
§11.2. Consideration of Tidelands in Minimum l Lot Size. Gener-
ally the term "lot" in a zoning ordinance has no 'xed meaning. Its 
meaning must be derived from its context and th~ circumstances in 
which it is used.1 In Becket v. Building Inspector qf Marblehead,2 the 
issue before the Appeals Court was whether tidelant{-that area of the 
shore alternately exposed and flooded by the tides-kould be included 
in the makeup of a lot in order to meet the minimu~ lot area require-
ment of the Marblehead zoning by-law.3 i 
i 
Massachusetts property law traditionally viewed ~dal areas as land. 
Private ownership of tidelands was recognized by thtt colonial ordinance 
of 1641-1647, which, in order to encourage Httor~l owners to build 
wharves, extended private title to littoral property ~s far as mean low 
water line or 100 rods ( 1650 feet) from mean high! water line, which-
' 
36 See text at note 24 supra. 
§11.2. 1 See Moynihan, Real and Personal Property, 19~ ANN. SURv. MASs. 
LAw § 1.4 at 8. i 
2 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 185, 373 N.E.2d 1195.1 3 Id. at 188, 373 N.E.2d at 1197. The relevant by-law efined the word "Lot" as "[a] single area of land defined by metes, bounds, or bo ndary lines in a duly recorded deed or shown on a duly recorded plan." It defin "Lot Area'' as "[t]he 
horizontal area within the exterior lines of the lot, exclusive f any area in a public 
or private street or way." See id. at 190-91, 373 N.E.2d at 198. The by-law was 
later amended to specifically exclude tidelands. See text at n te 20 infra. 
! 5
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ever was less. 4 This private right of ownership was made subject only 
to the public right of fishing, fowling, and navigation.5 
The land which was the subject of the Becket suit, "Lot 4," had a 
total area of approximately 41,000 square feet of upland and approxi-
mately 7,500 square feet of adjoining tidelands. 6 It was situated in a 
district which required a minimum lot area of 20,000 square feet as a 
condition for obtaining a building permit.; Rockett, the trustee of the 
land, subdivided Lot 4 into two separate lots, one of which, "Lot 4A," 
was composed of upland of sufficient area to qualify for a permit to con-
struct a single-family dwelling.!! But one subdivision, "Lot 4B," met 
the area requirement only if the 7,500 square feet of tideland was in-
cluded in the total area. n 
The Marblehead building inspector issued building permits for both 
lots. 10 The plaintiffs, neighboring landowners, contested the issuance 
of the permits and sought a writ of mandamus in superior court to com-
pel their revocation.11 The superior court dismissed the portion of the 
complaint relating to "Lot 4A" but revoked the building permit issued 
for "Lot 4B." 12 The order of revocation was based on the court's con-
clusion that the zoning by-law was designed to prevent construction of 
residences on small lots of land and that this purpose would be defeated 
if the defendants were allowed to include tideland area in the total lot 
area.13 
4 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 191, 373 N.E.2d at 1198, citing Opinion 
of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 365 Mass. 681, 684-88, 313 N.E.2d 
561, 565-66 ( 1974). The Massachusetts rule granting private ownership to coastal 
property down to the mean low water mark is distinctly a minority view. See 
generally Student Comment, Public Right of Passage along the Coast: Opinion of the 
Justices to the House of Representatives, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw § 16.30, at 
389-400 for a comparison of the Massachusetts rule to the rules of other jurisdictions. 
At common law, private ownership in coastal lands extended only as far as the 
mean high water mark. Beyond that point, ownership was held by the Crown subject 
to certain rights of public use. See Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. at 684, 313 
N .E.2d at 565. 
5 Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. at 685, 313 N.E.2d at 566. 
6 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 185, 373 N.E.2d at 1196. 
; Id. at 187, 373 N.E.2d at 1196. 
s Id. at 185-86, 373 N.E.2d at 1196. 
n Id. at 187, 373 N.E.2d at 1196. "Lot 4B" was somewhat "L" shaped; it met 
the Marblehead street frontage requirement of 100 feet, but tapered off somewhat 
as it ran toward the waterfront. The 7500 square feet of tideland included in "Lot 
4B" were connected to an upland strip of land one foot wide and 129 feet long, 
which extended beyond the bulk of "Lot 4B" in a manner adjacent to the ocean-
ward line of "Lot 4A." Id., 373 N.E.2d at 1196-97. 
1o Id. at 186, 373 N.E.2d at 1196. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. The court also enjoined further construction of a dwelling on "Lot 4B" 
and ordered the owner to remove all construction theretofore on the lot. Id. 
13 Id. at 190, 373 N.E.2d at 1198. 
6
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In interpreting the intent and meaning of the Mar~lehead by-law, the 
superior court proceeded as if there were no defifitions to guide it. 
Instead, the court construed the by-law to exclude tidelands because, 
without such a construction, a disparity in usable upl nd lot sizes would 
be created within the zoning district if tidelands wer included in deter-
mmmg lot area. 14 This disparity would result beqause tideland area 
varies inversely with the slope of the bank: the ste~per the slope, the 
less tideland is exposed during low tide. In the aistrict in question 
varying slopes created tidelands ranging in width frqm as little as three 
feet to as much as seventy feet. 15 I 
The Appeals Court rejected the reasoning of the I superior court and 
vacated the judgment as it related to "Lot 4B." 16 ~he Appeals Comt 
refused to adopt the analysis of the court below b11cause it was based 
upon the superior ·comt's conclusion as to the inten~ of the zoning by-
law without regard to its actual text.J7 As it read at I the time the build-
ing permits were granted, the Marblehead zoning b~-law only excluded 
from the definition of "Lot Area" area in "a public lor private street or 
way." 18 Since the by-law made only this qualificatioq, the Appeals Court 
concluded that the people of the community, who we1re familiar with the 
variegated nature of the shore, expressed their intent ~hrough their zoning 
by-laws to include all other land, including tidel~nd, within the lot 
lines.19 ' 
The by-laws which were in effect when the penni~s were issued were 
later amended to specifically exclude " ... any hor~zontal area subject 
to oceanic tidal action and below mean high water .. 1 •• " 20 The Appeals 
Court cited this passage as implicit support for an i~terpretation of the 
14 Id. at 189-90, 373 N.E.2d at 1197-98. 
15 Id. at 189, 373 N.E.2d at 1197. The superior court's ~easoning can be illus-
trated from the following example. Suppose Lot I consists of an upland area 
measuring 100 feet along the shore and street and 130 feet ~etween the shore and 
street. This area, consisting of 13,000 square feet, would not by itself meet the 
Marblehead minimum lot size of 20,000 square feet. But ifl the lot were situated 
where, due to a gentle slope on the shore, the tideland exte1ds 70 feet, the owner 
might claim that the 7,000 square feet of tideland would br~g his property within 
the minimum lot size. The owner of nearby Lot II, withl the same upland di-
mensions, but with a precipitous slope at water's edge, could bot meet the minimum 
lot size because his tideland, which we will consider to be three feet wide, would 
only amount to 300 square feet. His total upland and tideland I lot area would amount 
to only 13,300 feet. The disparity arises because, as a praftical matter, only the 
upland area can be developed. ' 
16 Id. at 186, 373 N.E.2d at 1196. The judgment dismissinJ the complaint relative 
to "Lot 4A" was not appealed. Id. ! 
17 Id. at 190, 373 N.E.2d at 1198. I 
18 See note 3 supra. I 
19 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 191-92, 373 N.E.2d at!1198. 
20 See id. at 193 n.7, 373 N.E.2d at 1199 n.7. I 
I 7
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prior version of the by-laws which would allow the area of the tide-
lands to be included in the definition of "Lot Area." 21 
The court also addressed other contentions made by the plaintiffs that 
were not passed upon by the superior court. The plaintiffs argued that 
since the tideland of "Lot 4B" was connected to the upland only by a 
strip of land one foot wide and 129 feet long, 22 it was inaccessible and 
therefore inconsistent with a reasonable construction of the words "Lot" 
and "Lot Area." 23 Using the same reasoning employed in its construc-
tion ·of "Lot" and "Lot Area" above, the court rejected this contention 
and ruled that if the by-law were intended to restrict a lot to readily 
accessible land, it would have so provided expressly.24 The court also 
refused to infer from the fact that the upland and tideland areas were 
separately bounded and described in petitioner's deed that they were 
intended to be separate lots.25 
The plaintiffs' final contention was that "Lot 4B" violated a provision 
of the dimensional regulation requiring a special permit before a lot 
may be reduced in width by more than twenty-five percent at the point 
where the principal structure is located. 26 The Appeals Court declined 
to pass on this contention because it did not possess sufficient facts re-
garding "Lot 4B's" configuration to enable it to determine if the dimen-
sional regulation was met. 27 Instead, the court vacated the judgment 
with regard to "Lot 4B," and rem~mded the case to the superior court for 
further fact determinations.28 
In its decision, the Appeals Comt rejected the superior court's attempt 
to glean the statutory purpose of the zoning by-law from extrinsic facts 
and found the purpose in the express definitions of the words "Lot" and 
"Lot Area" within the context of the by-law and the supposed common 
understanding of those words by the people of the community. In doing 
so the Appeals Court was implicitly following established maxims of 
construction in the zoning field that, if possible, a zoning by-law will be 
interpreted in a manner which sustains its validity,2n and that the words 
of a by-law must be construed reasonably according to the context in 
which they appear 30 and their common and approved usage.31 
21 Id. at 193, 373 N.E.2d at 1199. 
22 See note 9 supra. 
23 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 193, 373 N.E.2d at 1199. 
24 Id. at 194, 373 N.E.2d at 1199. 
25 Id. 
26 See id. at 195, 373 N.E.2d at 1200. 
27 Id. at 196-97, 373 N.E.2d at 1200. 
28 Id. at 197, 373 N.E.2d at 1200. 
29 Doliner v. Town Clerk of Millis, 343 Mass. 10, 14, 175 N.E.2d 925, 927 
(1961). 
30 Rose v. Commissioner of Public Health, 361 Mass. 625, 630, 282 N.E.2d 81, 
84 ( 1972). 
8
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The effect of this rather literal approach without regard for extrinsic 
factors might be inferred from the subsequent amendment of the Mar-
blehead by-law which indicated that tidelands are to be excluded in 
computing minimum lot area. Becket will encoura~e the drafting of 
specifically detailed by-laws leaving little room for jud cial interpretation 
concerning statutory purpose. Such detailed by-law will obviate the 
dangers of literal yet untoward judicial constructions that fail to achieve 
the community's purpose in setting minimum lot sizes. 
§11.3. Eminent Domain: Evidence of Fair Marke~ Value. When a 
parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, how is the I land's fair market 
value to be determined for purposes of compensating I the owner? The 
three chief methods used by real estate appraisers have been summarized 
in State v. Wilson. 1 They are_: 
1. The current cost of reproducing a property 1Jss . depreciation 
from deterioration and functional and economic oHsolescence [the 
"DRC'' method]. 2. The value which the property's net earning 
power will support, based upon a capitalization of net income [the 
"income capitalization" method]. 3. The value i~dicated by re-
cent sales of comparable properties in the markdt [the "market 
study" method).2 
In Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority,3 the Supreme 
Judicial Court reviewed the suitability of these methods and, most sig-
nificantly, reformulated the guidelines for utilizing t~e DRC method, 
the least favored method of the three. The plaintiff }vas the owner of 
two parcels of land which were taken by the New B~dford Redevelop-
ment Authority.4 In the basement of one of the buildings on the land 
was a tire retreading shop. The rest of . the building was used for 
installing tires and for selling tires, automotive suppli¢s, and household 
goods.5 Not satisfied with the award offered by the Adthority, the plain-
tiff brought an action for assessment of damages under chapter 79, sec-
tion 12.6 At the trial, the plaintiff was permRted to introduce evidence 
of the cost of reproducing the buildings. A jury awarded the plaintiff 
$429,000 and a judgment was entered for him.7 The Aljlthority appealed, 
I 
31 Foster v. Mayor of City of Beverly, 315 Mass. 567, 569, 153 N.E.2d 693, 694 
(1944). 
§11.3. 1 6 Wash. App. 443, 493 P..2d 1252 ( 1972 ). 
2 Id. at 447-48, 493 P.2d at 1256, citing AMERICAN INSTITTE OF REAL EsTATE 
APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL EsTATE 60 (5th ed. 1 7). 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1483, 377 N.E.2d 909. 
4 Id., 377 N.E.2d at 910. : 
5 Id. at 1484, 377 N.E.2d at 910-11. 
6 Id. at 1483, 377 N.E.2d at 910, 
7 Id. 
9
Huber: Chapter 11: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1978
§11.3 ZONING AND LAND USE 249 
claiming that evidence of value based on the DRC method should not 
have been admitted.8 
The Appeals Court reversed the judgment of the superior court, find-
ing error in the admission of DRC evidence.H The court held that such 
evidence should be used only when a) reproduction of the premises 
would have been reasonable, and b) it is impossible to determine the 
property's value utilizing the conventional fair market or income capi-
talization values.10 The court was of the view that proof of market 
value was not a practical impossibility under the conventional methods, 
because the plaintiff's expert had testified to a value based on income 
capitalization.11 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted the plaintiff's motion for further 
appellate review,12 reversed the decision of the Appeals Court, and 
affirmed the judgment of the superior court.13 The Court noted initially 
that the measure of damages in an eminent domain case is the property's 
fair market value at the time of the taking: this is "the highest price 
which a hypothetical willing buyer would pay to a hypothetical willing 
seller in an assumed free and open market." 14 The Court then set fmth 
the three methods identified in State v. Wilson, 15 noting that in Massa-
chusetts the methods are not equally applicable or readily interchange-
able in particular cases.16 It stressed that the DRC method is "limited 
to special situations in which data cannot be reliably computed under 
the other two methods." n It pointed out that this method is appropri-
ate for unique or special purpose 18 property because there, conventional 
s Id. at 1483, 1484, 377 N.E.2d at 910-11. 
n Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 5 Mass. App. 289, 294, 
296, 362 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1977). 
10 Id. at 291-92, 362 N.E.2d at 540-41. 
11 Id. at 293-94, 362 N.E.2d at 541-42. 
12 372 Mass. 873, 362 N.E.2d 538 (1977). 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1494, 377 N.E.2d at 914-15. 
14 Id. at 1484, 377 N.E.2d at 911. 
15 See text at note 2 supra. 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1486, 377 N.E.2d at 911. 
17 Id., citing Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority, 335 Mass. 189, 194-95, 138 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1956). 
18 Special purpose property is property adapted for a specialized use. In Newton 
Girl Scout Council, note 17 supra, the Court identified as such property "service-
type properties like churches, convents, hospitals, country clubs, school and college 
premises and buildings of religious and charitable societies and similar organiza-
tions." 335 Mass. at 196, 138 N.E.2d at 774. The Co"eia Court indicated that the 
above phrase was no more than a "generalization": 
[W]e did not purport, as the defendant here seems to argue, to state an in-
flexible rule strictly limiting the range of permissible applications of the DRC 
or any other method. Indeed, the cases cited in Newton Girl Scout Council, 
Inc., show that departures from the "norm" of comparable sale approaches as 
10
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valuation methods do not operate well.u1 For instance, the market study 
method may be difficult to apply because willing buy~rs and sellers do 
not exist, thus making realistic comparisons difficuit.:w The income 
capitalization method is based on the supposed income 1a property would 
bring through rental. 21 For special purpose property, this method tends 
to produce a figure less than the real value of the property. 22 The DRC 
method may be the best way to establish the value of ia special purpose 
property. However, the DRC method frequently res~1ts in "more lib-
eral awards than would be reached by alternative 1 methods of ap-
praisal." 23 Therefore, values based on this method, not surprisingly, 
are usually offered in evidence by the property owner and objected to 
by the property taker.24 
1 
I 
An example of an appropriate case for the applic~tion of the DRC 
method offered by the Court was Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.25 In that case, use of the DRC 
method was allowed to determine the value of a priv~te wooded camp-
ing area, where the property was "of a type, not fre4uently bought or 
sold, but usually acquired by their owners and deyeloped from the 
ground up, so that the cost of land plus the reproduction cost (less 
depreciations where appropriate) of improvements may be more rele-
vant than in the ordinary case." 2n \Vhile the DRC method is most 
frequently utilized in cases involving charitable and Buhlic service-type 
properties, as in the Newton Girl Scout Council Case, ~he Correia Court 
expressly stated that no rule exists strictly limiting the application of 
the DRC method to such properties.2 i Use of the DRC method, the 
Court noted, has also been permitted where "certain commercial and 
industrial properties" are involved. 2H I 
The Comt described the DRC method as a more complex and re-
sourceful means of determining the real value of special purpose prop-
erty which may be helpful "where the evidence warrants the conclusion 
that the real value of a property taken by eminent <!lomain cannot be 
evidence of value for so-called special purpose properties ~ave been allowed 
for certain commercial and industrial properties. 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1487, 377 N.E.2d at 912. 
10 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1486-88, 377 N.E.2d at 911-12. 
20 Id. at 1486, 377 N.E.2d at 911-12. 
21 See 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT DoMAIN§ 12.32~3][c] (3d ed. 1979). 
22 See Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, Co eia v. New Bedford 
Redevelopment Authority, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1483, 377 N E.2d 909. 
23 See 2 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAw oF EMINENT DoMAIN at 1 
(2d ed. 1953). 
2-! Id. 
2il 335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 ( 1956 ). . 
26 Id. at 194-95, 138 N.E.2d at 773. I 
2i 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1487, 377 N.E.2d at 912. See note 18 supra. 
9 hl i 
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shown by [the market study method or income capitalization method]." 2n 
However, one danger posed by the DRG method is that excessive awards 
may be made for property taken unless the obsolescence and inadequacy 
of the special purpose property as well as its physical depreciation are 
adequately discounted. 30 
The Supreme Judicial Cowt, finding the impossibility test too rigid in 
light of the uncertainties involved in the valuation of real estate,31 over-
turned the Appeals Court ruling. The Court emphasized that the DRC 
method has a disfavored status based on the practical danger of exces-
sive awards due to the possibility of inadequate consideration of depre-
ciation factors, and the collective experiences of real estate practitioners, 
commentators, and courts.32 However, the Court held that the "need" 
for DRC evidence in cases of difficult valuations of unique buildings 
which are used for special or unusual purposes, and which are not fre-
quently bought or sold, not the "impossibility" of use of other methods, 
should determine its admissibility.33 In such a case, the Comt reasoned, 
it is difficult to reach a reliable figure for fair market value based on the 
exclusive use of any one method of valuation, and it is unreasonable to 
impose a strict barrier to the reasonable use of the DRC method where 
plausible, but not wholly satisfactory, calculations may be made based 
upon more conventional methods.34 The Court held that "the trial judge 
should be allowed to exercise sound discretion in determining when 
special conditions exist so as to justify the use of such data." 35 
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Court held that when 
expert testimony showed that the structure was unique, that there were 
no sales of comparable real estate in the area at the time, and that the 
net income capitalization method was at best conjectural, and where 
the trial judge gave proper weight to the DRC method evidence in his 
charge to the jury, admission of that evidence was not error. 36 
The first criterion for the use of DRC evidence is that the property is 
used for a special purpose or contains a unique structure. The Court 
29 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1487-88, 377 N.E.2d at 912, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 352 Mass. 143, 147-48, 224 N.E.2d 186, 190 
{1967). 
30 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1488, 377 N.E.2d at 912. 
31 Id. at 1492, 377 N.E.2d at 914. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1491, 377 N.E.2d at 913. 
35 Id. at 1493, 377 N.E.2d at 914. This is a significant relaxation of the Appeals 
Court's formulation of the admissibility of such evidence. The Appeals Court re-
quired the trial court to make a preliminary finding that valuation under con-
ventional methods is impossible before DRC evidence may be admitted. See 5 
Mass. App. at 293, 294, 362 N.E.2d at 541, 542. 
36 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1493-94, 377 N.E.2d at 914. 
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noted the unique aspects of Correia's building, such as the special 
weight-bearing construction, the hydraulic lifts, and the service pits.37 
The owner had removed the fixtures and put them in another building,38 
leaving only the special weight-bearin~ construction a~ the special or 
unique feature of the property.39 While labeling this 4 close case, the 
Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his disc~etion in finding 
the property to be special purpose property.40 i 
Since the Court indicated this is a close case, certai* aspects of the 
decision should be read narrowly. It does not expand the use of DRC 
method evidence beyond property with a unique feature for which there 
is no ready market. However, this case does probably indicate the 
outer limit for the use of DRC evidence for commercial property, par-
ticularly because, in addition to the unique aspect of the property, the 
Court stressed the unreliability of the data resulting froin more conven-
tional methods of valuation.H The Court further poin~ed out that the 
DRC method evidence was not conclusive as to value,i but was to be 
considered along with all other evidence and that the i trial judge had 
instructed the jury as to the appropriate weight it sho~d be given.42 
Perhaps what is most significant about Correia is that the Court re-
treated from its earlier statements which seemed to set up an "impossi-
bility" test for use of the DRC method.43 The general criticism of DRC, 
as opposed to income capitalization and market study, is that it is con-
sidered unreliable. Where the property is unique or special property, 
the opposite is true, and DRC is more reliable than thei two more con-
, 
37 Id. at 1493, 377 N.E.2d at 914. The unique aspects are mo~e clearly noted in 
the opinion of the Appeals Court, which set forth the substanc~ of the plaintiff's 
witness' testimony. These factors were that the floor of the fa<jility was of steel-
reinforced concrete designed to bear the weight of heavy trucks, the building was 
wired to power electric tools specific to tire retreading and refitting, it had a steam-
generating boiler for use in retreading, its doors could accommodate large trucks, 
and it contained several alignment pits and hydraulic lifts. 5 Mass. App. at 292, 362 
N.E.2d at 541. One might legitimately wonder why the Supreme Judicial Court 
considered this building unique. Its description resembles nothing more than a 
well-equipped, albeit large, service station facility of which there must be scores 
throughout the commonwealth. 
ss Supplemental Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 9, Correi~ v. New Bedford 
Redevelopment Authority, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1483, 377 N.E.~d 909. 
39 Id. 
40 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1493, 377 N.E.2d at 914. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1494, 377 N.E.2d at 914. 
43 The Court stated: "The Appeals Court's statement of an 'impossibility' test in 
this case finds support in what may be unnecessarily broad language in some of 
our older cases." The Court cited as such cases Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge 
Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 518, 109 N.E.2d 148, 151 (1952); Cochrane v. Com-
monwealth, 175 Mass. 299, 303, 56 N .E. 610, 611 ( 1900). 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1491-92 and n.4, 377 N.E.2d at 913 and n.4. 
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ventional methods. There, it is not logical that the "possibility," albeit 
speculativeness, of the conventional methods should serve as a bar to the 
DRC method. While the Court stated that the three methods are not 
"equally applicable or ... interchangeable,'~ 44 Correia nevertheless makes 
clear that in some instances two methods of valuation will be desirable 
in a single case. 
§11.4. Nonprohibitable Use: Abortion Clinic. The United States 
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade 1 established that the indi-
vidual's right to privacy comprehends a pregnant woman's right to an 
abortion during the early stages of pregnancy. Roe prohibits the states 
from "interpos[ing] material obstacles to the effectuation of a woman's 
counselled decision to terminate her pregnancy during her first trimes-
ter." 2 In Framingham Clinic v. Board of Selectmen of Southborough 3 
the Supreme Judicial Court found-and invalidated-such a material 
obstacle in the form of a zoning by-law prohibiting abortion clinics. 
Framingham Clinic proposed to offer its clients family planning and 
gynecological services, including termination of pregnancies during the 
first trimester, all on an outpatient basis.4 The clinic was to be housed 
in an office building located in an industrial park district, pursuant to 
the Southborough zoning by-law permitting "Office Buildings" at the 
proposed site.5 
In order to obtain a determination of need from the Department of 
Public Health,6 Framingham Clinic was required to show compliance 
with applicable zoning by-laws.7 The Board of Selectmen and the Town 
Counsel of Southborough assured Framingham Clinic of its compliance,8 
and preliminary steps in the Department of Public Health approval proc-
ess for the issuance of a determination of need for the clinic then took 
place. 9 Before final Department of Public Health approval was given, 
however, the Southborough Planning Board initiated action to amend 
the by-laws in order to preclude the operation of the clinic. The amend-
44 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1486, 377 N.E.2d at 911. 
§ll.4. 1 410 u.s. ll3 (1973). 
2 Framingham Clinic v. Board of Selectmen of Southborough, 373 Mass. 279, 
288, 367 N .E.2d 606, 612 ( 1977). 
3 373 Mass. 279, 367 N.E.2d 606 (1977). 
4 Id. at 280, 367 N.E.2d at 607. 
5 See SouTHBOROUGH MAss. ZoNING BY-LAw, § IV, 7, A (2) (reproduced 373 
Mass. at 281 n.3, 367 N.E.2d at 608 n.3). 
6 G.L. C. 111 §§ 25C, 51; MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 
DETERMINATION OF NEED REGULATIONS, 105 Code Mass. Regs. 100 et. seq. 
7 373 Mass. at 280, 367 N.E.2d at 608. 
s Id. at 280-81, 367 N.E.2d at 608. 
9 Id. at 281, 367 N.E.2d at 608. 
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ment, which prohibited operation of abortion clinics i~1 all zoning dis-
tricts, was approved in a special town meeting.10 
The plaintiffs, Framingham Clinic, Inc. ( a for-profit, corporation), its 
three directors, its medical director (a physician), imd two women 
residents of Southborough, joined in an action comm~nced in the Su-
preme Judicial Court for Suffolk County seeking to 'have the South-
borough zoning amendment declared invalid and I its enforcement 
enjoined.n Justice Wilkins reserved and reported thee case for deter-
mination by the full bench.12 
The majority opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court' held the by-law 
amendment invalid on due process and equal protfction grounds.13 
Citing Roe v. Wade, the Court found the effect of the: by-law to be an 
extreme intrusion into a woman's fundamental right tcil privacy.14 The 
Court allowed that some regulation of the "effectuatioit" of an abortion 
decision during the first trimester might be permissibleJ5 but it declined 
to refine its analysis further because the by-law on its face violated the 
basic right of privacy with no acceptable justification.;16 The majority 
further characterized the by-law amendment as disc~iminatory in its 
treatment of abortion clinics.17 Thus, the by-law, qllowing lawfully 
operated medical clinics to do business within the Town, of Southborough 
only if they do not perform admittedly lawful abortions, arbitrarily bur-
dened exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed right tp an abortion and 
I 
violates equal protection of the law.18 For these two n~asons the South-
borough zoning by-law amendment was declared inva~id. 
Framingham Clinic differs from most cases that hav~ arisen concern-
ing limitations on abortion, because the physical pl~nt, and not the 
activities of personnel, was the object of the regulation. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Judicial C<>urt, citing a 1917 United States Supreme Court 
decision,19 reaffirmed the principle that a law exercising the zoning power 
may not be framed in a manner offensive to constitutionally protected 
10 Id. at 281-82, 367 N.E.2d at 608. The amendment added "Abortion Clinics" 
as the fifth of the "Prohibited Uses-All Districts" to SoUTHBOR!OUGH MAss. ZoNING 
BY-LAw § VIII, 8. Id. at 282, 367 N.E.2d at 608. 
11 373 Mass. at 279, 367 N.E.2d at 607. 
12 Id. at 282-83, 367 N.E.2d at 609. 
1a Id. at 283, 367 N.E.2d at 609. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 284, 367 N.E.2d at 610. 
16 Id. I 
17 Id. at 285, 367 N.E.2d at 610. 1 
18 Id. at 284-85, 367 N.E.2d at 610. t 
19 Buchanan v. Worley, 245 U.S. 60 ( 1917). Cf. Village of rlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 ( 1977 (refusal to rezone 
from single family to multi-family residential use held not to be racially dis-
criminatory). 
! 
I 15
Huber: Chapter 11: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1978
§11.4 ZONING AND LAND USE 255 
freedoms. 20 In so holding, the majority opinion rejected the Town's 
arguments that "public sentiment" as expressed through the vote of the 
town meeting should be given effect.21 The Court found that argument 
irrelevant and dangerously susceptible to deprivation of liberty through 
tyranny of the majority.22 
The Court also rejected the Town's arguments that the zoning by-law 
amendment was valid because the clinic would be a profit-making ven-
ture,23 because other such clinics are available elsewhere in the state,24 
and because the state is under no obligation to finance nontherapeutic 
abortions.25 
The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hennessey 26 maintained that 
the by-law was invalid as a matter of statutory construction, thus mak-
ing it unnecessary to reach the constitutional principles of Roe v. Wade.2i 
The concurring justices considered that Southborough's regulation of 
abortion clinics was preempted by the legislature's delegation of that 
authority to the Department of Public Health.28 General Laws chapter 
111, sections 25C and 51, regulate the process whereby a clinic obtains 
approval to operate within the state. The concurrence cited Bloom v. 
Worcester, 211 for the standard to be applied to determine whether state 
law preempts local regulation. This standard holds that even in the 
absence of express indication of the legislature's intention to preempt 
the field, inference of such intent may be made if circumstances so 
indicate. 30 
The concurring opinion also stated that the zoning enabling statute, 
which requires uniform regulations for each class of kind of use,31 did 
not authorize the Southborough by-law because there was no rational 
basis for excluding only those clinics performing abortions.32 
Framingham Clinic, while decided primarily on the grounds of equal 
protection and due process, reaffirms an old principle of zoning law in 
the modem context of the continuing abortion controversy. A validly 
20 373 Mass. at 286, 367 N.E.2d at 611. 
21 Id. at 287, 367 N.E.2d at 611. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 287, 367 N.E.2d at 611-12. 
25 Id. at 288, 367 N.E.2d at 612. 
26 Id. at 288-89, 367 N.E.2d at 612-13. Justice Quirico joined in the opinion of 
the Chief Justice. 
27 Id., 367 N.E.2d at 612. 
28 Id. at 289, 367 N.E.2d at 612. 
29 363 Mass. 136, 293 N.E.2d 268 (1973). 
30 I d. at 155, 293 N .E.2d at 280. 
31 See former G.L. c. 40A, § 2. The current version is G.L. c. 40A, § 3. 
32 373 Mass. at 289, 367 N.E.2d at 612-13. 
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adopted zoning by-law is invalid when it effectively d rives individuals 
of their constitutionally protected freedoms. Munic palities may not 
undermine a constitutional guarantee by adopting zoni g by-laws which 
exclude abortion clinics altogether. However, a muni 'pality is not pro-
hibited from exercising any reasonable regulation of abortion clinics, 
so a regulation as to location within certain specifie districts is still 
permissible. , 
I §11.5. Principal and Accessory Uses. A "principal use" of property is 
the primary purpose or function that a parcel of land o~a building serves 
or is intended to serve, 1 while an "accessory use" is a su ordinate use that 
is incidental and related to the principal use. 2 Durin the Survey year 
the Appeals Court found occasion to carefully delinea e and ·distinguish 
these two types of uses in Town of Foxborough v. B, y State Harness 
Horse Racing and Breeding Association, Inc.3 : 
Bay State leased to Jerome Coffman the parking lots t~at served its race 
track facility in Foxborough, for the purpose of opera~ing a flea market 
on Sundays.4 Coffman planned to charge individual ~ealers for booth 
space and charge patrons for parking. Patrons were qot to be charged 
for admission to the market, however.5 The Tow* of Foxborough 
sought and was granted an injunction prohibiting the I operation of the 
flea market because it allegedly violated the provisio*s of the Town's 
special use district zoning by-law.6 The Appeals Co*rt, reversing the 
judgment and injunction entered by the superior court\ on behalf of the 
Town, rejected Foxborough's assertion that the fieaj market was an 
accessory use to the race track and parking lots wh~ch use was pro-
hibited by the by-law's accessory use clause.7 ' 
§11.5. 1 3 R. M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAw OF ZoNING § 16.11 (2d ed. 1977). 
2 Id. 
3 5 Mass. App. 613, 366 N .E.2d 773 ( 1977). 
4 Id. at 614, 366 N.E.2d at 775. 
5 Id. at 615, 366 N.E.2d at 776. 
a Id., 366 N.E.2d at 775. Another basis that was advanced for the injunction 
was that the flea market use violated certain provisions of the ~unday closing laws, 
particularly G.L. c. 136, §§ 4 & 5. The Appeals Court held tha~ the Sunday closing 
laws did not provide a basis for an injunction. Section 4 was not applicable because 
of the absence of an admission fee; there was no contention that the parking fee 
constituted a "requisite for admission." Id. at 619, 373 N.E.lat 778. Moreover, 
§ 5 was not applicable because the types of wares to be sold, " arious articles such 
as paintings, antiques, hand crafted items and the like," are ex . pted from § 5 by 
the provisions of § 6. ; · . 
7 5 Mass. App. at 616, 366 N.E.2d at 776. The clause Hsts as a prohibited 
accessory use: "8. Trailers or other temporary vehicles or struc~ures for displaying 
goods or storing them for direct delivery to retail customers." '. 
The court rejected out of hand the Town's contention tltat the use of the 
premises as a flea market was specifically prohibited as an Tfolther amusement 
and recreation service, outdoor" use. The court could see nothing in the flea market 
. ' 17
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The court first noted that there must be a sufficient nexus between the 
principal use and the alleged accessory use in order to characterize the 
challenged use as accessory. The simple fact that the same locus is 
utilized for two dissimilar purposes is not sufficient to constitute the 
required nexus, 8 if the alleged accessory use is not dependent upon or 
pe1tinent to the principal use.!! Quoting Lawrence v. Zoning Bd. of North 
Branford, 10 a Connecticut case, the court said an accessory use must be 
not only subordinate to the principal use, it must also be attendant or con-
comitant to the principal use. 11 The Lawrence court defined an accessory 
use as "a use which is customary in the case of a permitted use and 
incidental to it." 1 ~ It then went further to define the crucial words 
"incidental" and "customary." "Incidental" means that the use is subor-
dinate and minor in significance to the principal use,' but it also bears 
a reasonable relationship to the principal use. 1a "Customary" means that 
the use is usual in connection with the principal use as evidenced by 
common and long practice.14 
Applying this reasoning, the Appeals Court found no connection between 
the racetrack and the flea market other than their sharing the same 
premises.15 Accordingly, the court found that the flea market was not 
an accessory use to the racetrack, but was a separate principal use.16 
The court, having made the determination that the flea market was 
a principal use, applied the customary analysis treating the principal use 
separately from the accessory use, in order to see if the flea market could 
be brought within the permitted principal use of a "retail establishment" 
under the Foxborough by-law.17 Construing the by-law as a whole, the 
court found that the accessory use clause did not act to prohibit a 
principal retail business simply because it is conducted outdoors.18 The 
use "which would lend plausability to the notion that the operation somehow 
provides 'recreational shopping' rather than 'serious shopping' . . . assuming 
that there may be circumstances which would make such a distinction viable." Id. 
H Id. at 616-17, 366 N.E.2d at 776-77, citing Needham v. Winslow Nurseries, 
Inc., 330 Mass. 95, 111 N .E.2d 453 (1953) (holding that the sale of Christmas 
trees and wreaths not grown on the premises is not an accessory use because it is 
the sale of dead, rather than living, plants). 
n 5 Mass. App. at 618, 366 N.E.2d at 777, quoting Wirulow Nurseries, note 8 
supra, 330 Mass. at 101, 111 N.E.2d at 457. 
10 158 Conn. 509, 264 A.2d 552 (1969). 
11 .5 Mass. App. at 618, 366 N .E.2d at 777, quoting Lawrence, note 10 supra, 
158 Conn. at 512-13, 264 A.2d at 554. 
12 158 Conn. at 511, 264 A.2d at 554 (citations omitted). 
13 Id. at 512, 264 A.2d at 554. 
H Id. at 512-13, 264 A.2d at 554. 
15 5 Mass. App. at 616, 366 N.E.2d at 776. 
16 Id. at 617, 366 N.E.2d at 777. 
H Id. at 619, 366 N.E.2d at 778. 
18 Id. at 617, 366 N.E.2d at 777. 
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court construed the term "establishment" for the purposes of the by-law 
as indicating a distinct physical place of business Jn whose location is 
fixed. 20 The establishment need not be enclosed 21 and the individual 
booths need not be permanently affixed. 22 This definition would include 
businesses, such as the flea market operation, which operate periodically 
at the same locus. Thus the Appeals Court held that the flea market was 
a principal use permitted as a retail establishment within the meaning of 
the Foxborough by-law.23 
While some zoning ordinances define the term "accessory use" within 
the ordinance itself, others do not. Where the term is not defined in the 
ordinance it may be necessary for the court to define it within its con-
struction of the ordinance. Town of Foxborough represents the first 
explicit judicial definition in Massachusetts of the term "accessory use" 
in the absence of a definition provided in the by-law. The construction 
given by the Appeals Court conforms to typical definitions included 
in by-laws,24 by requiring that the accessory use be subordinate to the 
principal use. The court's construction does not specifically require that 
the accessory use be "customarily incidental" to the principal use, a 
limitation that is typically present in a by-law definition of the term.25 
Nevertheless, a "customarily incidental" limitation may be implicit in 
the requirement that the accessory use be attendant or concomitant to 
the principal use since the sources cited by the court to support that 
requirement include the phrase "customarily incidental" in their defini-
tions.26 Such a result would seem to follow logically because a use may 
be subordinate, and have a rational nexus to the principal use, yet still 
not be appropriate for the district.27 
19 Id., citing A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 496 (1945); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 326 Mass. 757, 
762, 96 N.E.2d 859, 862 (1951). 
2o 5 Mass. App. at 617, 366 N.E.2d at 777, quoting 1 WEBSTER's THIRD NEw 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 778 ( 1976), 
21 5 Mass. App. at 617, 366 N.E.2d at 777. 
22 Id. at 617-18, 366 N.E.2d at 777, citing Commonwealth v. Morrison, 197 Mass. 
199, 201, 83 N.E. 415, 415-16 ( 1908), which described the daily operation of a 
lunch wagon as being at a fixed place despite the fact that the wagon was driven off 
each day. 
23 5 Mass. App. at 619, 366 N.E.2d at 778. 
24 See 2 R.M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAw OF ZoNING § 9.28 (2d ed. 1977). 
25 See Lawrence, note 10 supra, 158 Conn. at 511, 264 A.2d at 554, citing 1 
R.M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAw OF ZoNING § 8.26 (lst ed. 1968). 
26 See 5 Mass. App. at 618, 366 N.E.2d at 777, citing Latcrence, note 10 supra, 
158 Conn. at 512-13, 264 A.2d at 554; 3 R.M. ANDEHSON, AMEHICAN LAW OF ZoNING 
§ 16.11, at 31 (2d ed. 1977); 3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAw 
§ 74.14, at 415 (1975). 
27 See, e.g., Latcrence, note 10 supra, 158 Conn. at 514-15, 264 A.2d at 555-56 
(upholding zoning board of appeals' determination that the raising of goats and 
chickens to feed the family is not customarily incidental to a residential use in the 
center of town). 
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Rather than concluding with its holding that the flea market was not 
an accessory use, the court went further to determine if the flea market 
could qualify as a permitted principal use within the locality's zoning 
by-law. In so doing, the Appeals Court seemed to follow a rule of strict 
construction since conducting retail business was a permitted use and 
the by-law did not explicitly prohibit outdoor retail business, which, the 
court reasoned, it easily could have done.2s 
§11.6. Judicial Power to Order Issuance of Special Permits. Massa-
chusetts zoning laws provide for the granting of special permits to exempt 
the recipient from specified restrictions of a locality's zoning regulations.1 
These exceptions, however, must be "in harmony with the general purpose 
and intent of the ordinance or by-law."~ Although the granting of special 
permits is discretionary,3 General Laws chapter 40A, section 4, has been 
interpreted to require that local ordinances must provide adequate 
standards for the guidance of the special permit granting authority.4 
The special permit granting authority for its part must "set forth clearly 
the reason or reasons for its decisions." 5 If the reasons for the denial of 
a special permit are legally invalid, the superior court in which review 
of the permit granting authority's decision is sought may, in certain 
circumstances, itself order that a permit be granted. 6 
In Cape Ann Development Corp. v. City of Gloucester (Cape Ann 1),7 
the plaintiff developer had obtained statutory approval of its perimeter 
plan for a shopping center in a district permitting such use by operation 
of General Laws chapter 41, section 81P.8 Section 7A of the Zoning 
Enabling Act protected the use of land shown on a statutorily approved 
plan from changes in local zoning ordinances for three years.n Subse-
quent to plaintiff's procuring approval, the City amended its zoning 
28 5 Mass. App. at 618, 366 N .E.2d at 778. 
§11.6. 1 See former G.L. c. 40A, § 4. The current version will be found at G.L. 
c. 40A, § 9. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. Discretion is indicated by the permissive word "may" in the statute. 
4 Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 294-95, 285 N.E.2d 
436,439 (1972), citing MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 
638, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350 (1970). 
5 See former G.L. c. 40A, § 18. The current version will be found at G.L. c. 
40A, § 15. 
6 Cape Ann Development Corp. v. City Council of Gloucester, 1978 1\fass. Adv. 
Sh. 596, 373 N.E.2d 218. Judicial review of decisions of the special permit granting 
authority is provided for by G.L. c. 40A, § 21 (amended by Acts of 1975, c. 808, 
§ 3; current version at G.L. c. 40A, § 17). 
7 Cape Ann Land Development Corp. v. City of Gloucester, 371 Mass. 19, 353 
N.E.2d 645 ( 1976). For a discussion of this case, see Huber, Zoning and Land 
Use, 1977 ANN. SURv. MAss. LAw § 15.6. 
8 371 Mass. at 20, 353 N.E.2d at 645-46. 
9 The current version of former § 7 A will be found at G.L. c. 40A, § 6. 
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ordinance to prohibit a shopping center on the developer's land and 
adopted regulations that required a special permit from the City Council 
before a shopping center could be constructed.10 When the developer's 
application for a building permit was denied, it appealed the denial to 
the superior court, and also sought declaratory relief regarding the 
effect of the amended zoning restrictions on its right to build the planned 
shopping center.U 
The Supreme Judicial Court, modifying and affirming the judgment 
of the superior court held that during the protection of section 7 A the 
City Council could deny a special permit for the developer's failure to 
comply with the shopping center requirements of the zoning ordinance 
except for those requirements that are practically prohibitive of the use.12 
But the Court also held that the City Council could not erode the pro-
tection of section 7 A by refusing to grant a special permit simply for 
the reason that the locus would be used for a shopping center.13 The 
Court also rejected the City's challenge to the superior court's retention 
of jurisdiction of the declaratory judgment proceeding. Because the 
developer could institute a new proceeding if the special permit was 
denied, the Court found "practical merit" in the superior court's retention 
of jurisdiction.14 
Subsequ~nt to the Court's Cape Ann I decision, the City Council 
denied the special permit on five grounds. Three of these grounds 
related to traffic congestion, and the other two related to the cost of 
street improvement and the vitality of the City's downtown area.15 The 
superior court granted the developer's motion for summary judgment, 
thereby annulling the City Council's decision, and ordered the City 
Council to issue the special permit.16 On appeal, in Cape Ann Land 
Development Corp. v. City of Gloucester (Cape Ann II) the Supreme 
Judicial Court, in light of its decision in Cape Ann I, ruled that the 
grounds for denial of the special permit were legally invalid, and it 
affirmed the superior court's orderY The Court held that under the 
circumstances it was proper for the superior court judge to order issuance 
of the special permit.1s 
10 371 Mass. at 20-21, 353 N.E.2d at 646. 
11 Id. at 21, 353 N.E.2d at 646. 
12 Id. at 24, 353 N.E.2d at 648. 
13 Id. 
14 I d. at 25, 353 N .E.2d at 648. 
15 Cape Ann Land Development Corp. v. City of Gloucester, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
596, 373 N.E.2d 218, 219. 
16 Id., 373 N.E.2d at 219. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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The court's authority to issue an order to the appropriate local agency 
to grant a variance or special permit is derived from chapter 40A, section 
17 19 which gives the court the power to " ... make such other decree as 
justice and equity may require." However, such authority is rarely 
exercised because the statute may not be read as permitting judicial en-
croachment into the realm of administrative discretion.20 
The circumstances under which a court may order the issuance of a 
special permit or a variance, rather than remanding the case to the zoning 
board or appropriate local governing body, were enumerated in Lapenas 
v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brockton, ~ 1 a case involving the issuance 
of a variance. The Lapenas Court noted that if a variance had been 
denied solely on a legally invalid ground and the zoning board had 
indicated that otherwise a variance would have been granted, the re-
viewing court may order its issuance.22 Another ground for court-
ordered issuance without remand is that the decision was "unreasonable, 
whimsical, capricious or arbitrary." 23 As such, a decision would be an 
abuse of the discretionary power of the local agency. 
When a court decides that there are no legally valid grounds for the 
denial of a special permit, the city or town that denied the permit may 
not reconsider the application unless new data becomes available or 
additional grounds for denying the permit exist.24 
A judicial order to grant a special permit or variance is an extra-
ordinary remedy that has been used rarely and only in unusual circum-
stances.25 The courts are understandably hesitant to substitute their 
own judgment for the discretionary judgment of local authorities on 
matters of local concern. In this case the order is appropriate as it 
prevents the City from contravening the legal protection afforded the 
developer under section 7A for reasons that run counter to the Court's 
earlier decision in Cape Ann I. 
19 The parallel section of the former Zoning Act will be found at G.L. c. 40, § 21. 
20 See Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 
916 (1954). 
21 352 Mass. 530, 533-34, 226 N.E.2d 361, 364 (1967). 
22 Id. at 533-34, 226 N.E.2d at 364. 
23 Id. at 534, 226 N.E.2d at 364. 
24 See Cape Ann II, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 596, 373 N.E.2d at 219. 
25 See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512, 340 N.E.2d 
487 ( 1976) (special permit ordered where landowner's application for special permit 
had been pending for thirteen years and had thrice been denied on legally untenable 
grounds); Lapenas v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brockton, 352 Mass. 530, 226 
N .E .2d 361 ( 1967) (court order for special permit held not to invade power of 
zoning board of appeals where the only discretionary act of the board would be 
electing to record its recognition of a legal right). 
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§11.7. Zoning Regulation of Condominium Conversion. During the 
Survey year the power of a town to a regulate the conversion of existing 
structures to condominium-type ownership, via the zoning power, was at 
issue. In Goldman v. Town of Dennis 1 the owner of a cottage colony 2 
that was a non-conforming use contended that a Dennis by-law amend-
ment prohibiting conversion of a non-conforming cottage colony to con-
dominiums was invalid.3 The plaintiff-owner advanced three reasons in 
support of his challenge. These were: 1) that a town may not regulate 
or prevent creation of condominiums; 2) that the Zoning Enabling Act 4 
only permits local regulation of the use of land, and not of its ownership 
form; and 3) that the by-law violated the constitutional requirement of 
equal protection.5 The Court rejected all three contentions and affirmed 
the decision of the Land Court upholding the by-law as amended.6 
Addressing first the plaintiff's contention that a town may not regulate 
or prevent the creation of condominiums, the Court ruled that chapter 
183A, which governs condominiums, does not create an exception to the 
Zoning Enabling Act.7 This ruling was based upon the reasoning that 
section 15 of chapter 183A, exempting the division of a building into 
units from the operation of the Subdivision Control Law,H would be 
unnecessary if chapter 183A overrode the provisions of other statutes.9 
Therefore, since an exemption from zoning laws is not expressly stated 
in the statute, condominiums are subject to regulation through the zoning 
by-laws. 
Turning to plaintiff's second contention, the Court noted that former 
section 2 of the Zoning Enabling Act authorized regulation of the use 
of buildings, structures, and land. Such authority was limited, however, 
by former section 5 10 which made zoning by-laws inapplicable to a use 
§11.7. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1236, 375 N.E.2d 1212. 
2 The meaning of the term "cottage colony" was at issue in Goldman. The 
Land Court defined it as a "group of small summer vacation homes" and the Supreme 
Judicial Court accepted this definition. Id. at 1239, 375 N.E.2d at 1214. 
3 DENNIS, MAss. ZoNING BY-LAw § 2.4.3.6 provided: 
An existing non-conforming cottage colony may not be converted to a single 
family dwelling use under separate ownership unless the lot upon which each 
building is located complies with minimum rerjuirements for single family dwell-
ings in the zoning district in which the land is located, and such non-conforming 
cottage colony may not be converted to single family use under condominium 
type ownership unless the lot meets the minimum requirements for open space 
village development. 
4 See G.L. c. 40A, § 3. The case was decided under the former Act, for which 
the parallel provision was G.L. c. 40A, § 2. 
5 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1237, 375 N.E.2d at 1213. 
6 Id. at 1238-40, 375 N.E.2d at 1213-14. 
7 Id. at 1237, 375 N.E.2d at 1213. 
s See G.L. c. 41, §§ 81K-81GG. 
9 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1237-38, 375 N.E.2d at 1213. 
10 The current version, G.L. c. 40, § 6, specifically provides that zoning by-laws 
shall be applicable "to any change or substantial extension of such use." 
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existing at the time of the adoption of the by-law "to the extent to which 
it is used at the time of adoption" 11 of the by-law. Section 5 further 
provided that a zoning by-law will apply to the use of non-conforming 
property which is subsequently used for the same purpose as it was 
at the time of the adoption of the by-law but "to a substantially greater 
extent." 12 Thus, a change of use or a substantial extension of use will 
bring the non-conforming property within the application of the zoning 
by-law, despite the section 5 protection for non-conforming uses. 
The Court observed that it would have been reasonable for the town 
to believe that conversion of the cottage colony to single family con-
dominiums would encourage an expansion from seasonal summer use 
to year round use.13 Thus, conversion would constitute not only a change 
in the form of ownership but also an extension of a non-conforming use. 
The Court cited McAleer v. Board of Appeal-Y of Barnstable,14 in which 
it distinguished between a permissible increase in the intensity of a use 
within the non-conforming use privilege and an unlawful expansion of 
a non-conforming use.15 Such a distinction depends upon the spirit of 
the by-law.16 If a by-law does not prohibit an extension of the non-
conforming use through a mere increase of the non-conforming use in 
time, such increase is permissibleP ·'However, if the by-law expressly 
prohibits a change or extension of a no~conforming use, it may validly 
inhibit expansion of the non-conforming use from seasonal to year-
round.18 
Interpreting the words of the Dennis by-law, the Court found it not to 
be a prohibition of condominium-type ownership, but an explicit limita-
tion on the expansion of the non-conforming use that is merely phrased in 
terms of ownership.19 As such, the limitation is a valid regulation of 
change of use.20 Accordingly, the conversion of a seasonal cottage colony 
to condominiums which might be used on a year round basis may be 
validly prohibited under that by-law. 
The plaintiffs final contention was that the by-law unlawfully dis-
criminated between a cottage colony and a motel in violation of equal 
11 See former G.L. c. 40A, § 5. 
12 Id. 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1238, 375 N.E.2d at 1214. 
14 361 Mass. 317, 280 N.E.2d 166 ( 1972). 
15 Id. at 323, 280 N.E.2d at 170. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 324, 280 N.E.2d at 170. This was the nature of the bv-law at issue in 
McAleer, so the increase in operation of a lodge from seasonal to year-round use was 
a permitted extension. 
18 I d. at 323, 280 N .E.2d at 170. 
19 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1238-39, 375 N.E.2d at 1214. 
20 Id. 
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protection of the laws. The Court upheld the Land Court's ruling that 
the difference in usage between a motel, which is typically used by 
particular individuals for one or two nights throughout the year, and a 
cottage colony, which is used for longer periods but only during the 
summer, was sufficient constitutional justification for the difference in 
their treatment.21 
The result reached by the Court was a sound one. Property held 
under condominium type ownership must be subject to valid zoning 
regulations.22 The type of ownership alone should not be sufficient to 
exempt a property from the operation of zoning by-laws. If it were, a 
mere change in the form of ownership would allow a property owner to 
circumvent zoning regulations and render them ineffective. 23 
Valid zoning by-laws do not regulate condominiums on the basis of 
their form of ownership, but on the basis of the bulk of the structure, 
lot area, or use of the property as authorized by former section 2. The 
Dennis by-law prohibits not only condominium conversion of a cottage 
colony, but also conversion to separately owned single family dwellings.24 
Under both forms of ownership conversion is prohibited only where lot 
size does not meet the appropriate minimum requirements. Thus the 
by-law regulates use based on lot area, and not on form of ownership. 
21 Id. at 1239-40, 375 N.E.2d at 1214. The plaintiff also raised a vagueness chal-
lenge to the ordinance, claiming that it did not adequately define the term "cottage 
colony." The court held that since the issue was· not briefed on appeal, it was 
waived. It also accepted the Land Court's definition, which is set forth supra at 
note 2. 
22 This is recognized sub silentio in the Appeals Court decision in Perry v. Build-
ing Inspector of Nantucket, 4 Mass. App. 467, 472, 350 N.E.2d 733, 736 ( 1976). 
23 The Land Court gave the example of a single family residence converted to 
condominium ownership. If exempt from the zoning laws, each floor could be sold 
·as a condominium unit, thereby allowing multiple family use in a single family 
district. See Sarris v. Dennis, Docket No. 76255 (Land Court, Mass., Oct. 8, 1976). 
24 See note 3 supra. 
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